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ABSTRACT 
Military bases perform important national security missions. In order to 
perform these missions, specific electrical energy loads must have continuous, 
uninterrupted power even during terrorist attacks, adversary action, natural disasters, 
and other threats of specific interest to the military. While many global military 
bases have established microgrids that can maintain base operations and power 
critical loads during grid disconnect events where outside power is unavailable, 
many potential threats can cause microgrids to fail and shed critical loads. Nanogrids 
are of specific interest because they have the potential to protect individual critical loads 
in the event of microgrid failure. We present a systems engineering methodology 
that analyzes potential nanogrid configurations to understand which 
configurations may improve energy resilience and by how much for critical loads 
from a national security perspective. This then allows targeted deployment of 
nanogrids within existing microgrid infrastructure. A case study of a small military 
base with an existing microgrid is presented to demonstrate the potential of the 
methodology to help base energy managers understand which options are preferable and 
justify implementing nanogrids to improve energy resilience. 
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Executive Summary
Upholding a resilient power structure for military installations is paramount for the United
States to perform national security missions. There are many instances that exist today
that endanger this performance of national security. Instances, synonymous to threats in
this research, include: severe weather, malicious manipulation, terrorism, cyber-attack, and
other threats specific to theDepartment ofDefense (DOD). These threats create vulnerability
to critical loads on installations that are in need of an uninterrupted supply of power. In
response to this vulnerability, the DOD seeks to have 25% of all power from supporting
installations derive from renewable sources by the year of 2025 [1]. The examples of these
renewable (also known as DER) sources producing such power for this goal originate from
solar Photovoltaic (PV) or wind turbines [1]. Microgrids, in the early stages of testing, have
been the solution for the DOD to integrate such DER that aid in an uninterrupted supply of
power.
In many but not all microgrid implementations, a grid connection is present where the
microgrid can connect to or disconnect from the larger energy grid. In simple terms, all of
the electrical infrastructure inside the fence line of a facility, such as a military base, is the
microgrid. Nanogrids, a more localized form of power distribution, is a focal point of this
research. Deriving frommicrogrids, nanogrids differ by seeking to provide power to critical
loads closer to the point of power consumption [2]. This difference in proximity has the
potential to significantly reduce the negative effects of transmission and distribution lines
such as efficiency loss, single point of failure, etc., making resilience more probable [2].
Resilience, one of the three pillars of energy security, is defined by the United States
Navy (USN) as being ‘the ability of a system to anticipate, resist, absorb, respond, adapt,
and recover from a disturbance" (disturbance being a threat) [3]. A cornerstone of this thesis,
adopted by the approach proposed by Peterson et al., is the quantification of resilience with
the use of Mission Dependency Index (MDI) that captures the criticality of loads on DOD
installations and Expected Electrical Distribution Mission Impact (EEDMI) that is used to
quantify Mission Impact (MI) of a load against a threat over a specific period of time [4],
[5]. EEDMI is used to compare resilience of various architectures where a lower value is
more desirable due to decreased susceptibility of a threat. The higher the EEDMI value the
xv
more probable a critical load will have a disrupted power supply.
An additional cornerstone of this thesis provides a methodology with a sequential process
to evaluate resilience of nanogrids versus existing microgrids that a base energy manager
can use. The steps are as follows:
1. Collect System Information
2. Develop and Down-Select Nanogrid Architecture
3. Analyze Threats to Base Energy Security
4. Calculate Resilience
5. Analyze Results
6. Produce Final Design Recommendations
These steps listed above are intended to be used during the Operations, Maintenance, and 
Upgrade phase for a microgrid in the Systems Engineering "Vee" Model (which is shown 
in Chapter 1) and implemented in the nanogrid requirements and architecture phase. This 
layered "Vee" Model within the systems engineering process allows base energy managers 
to assess grid formation and energy resilience. A case study is provided within the thesis 
to apply the various focal points in order to assess nanogrid resilience against an existing 
microgrid structure. Where the microgrid system boundary is often confined to the boundary 
of a military base or other critical facility.
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The introduction chapter of this research broadly introduces global security and the impact
of climate change. As a front-runner in responding to this threat, the Department of Defense
(DOD) is analyzing howDistributed Energy Resources (DER) can be used onmilitary bases
as one part of a broader strategy. This chapter also defines and explains the importance of
energy security and resilience to national security missions, introduces nanogrids and their
relevance to current microgrid projects on military bases, provides motivation for research
and current ongoing projects, and briefly describes the relevance to the Systems Engineering
methodology used in the research and where the research fits into a traditional system life-
cycle process. Introduction of the research topic and relevance to current events and threats
aids the reader in understanding Chapter 2, which is published in the Multidisciplinary
Digital Publishing Institute’s special issue of Advances in Ancillary Services by DRES in
Distribution Grids [1].
The changing climate has already affected global security. Global security, synonymous
with international security, incorporates many militaries and nations to address risks to
mission assurance, readiness, and infrastructure [2]. The risks of a changing climate are
prevalent within the United States at global DOD military bases. Over the past ten years,
damage to military installations has increased and caused significant relief efforts due to
extreme weather events. For instance: hurricane damage in Puerto Rico and Tyndall Air
Force Base in Panama City, Florida cost the DOD over $5B in damages and disrupted
several missions [3]. From 2003–2013, the White House of Economic Advisers and the
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) estimated that utility grid outages due to severe weather
cost the country between $18–$33 billion annually [4]. In 2019, the Pentagon reported that
a total of 79 military installations were at risk of flooding due to rising sea levels induced
by climate change. Norfolk, one of the Navy’s largest bases, is seeing the effects already:
the main road to Norfolk Naval Station floods a few times a month with predictions that it
will continue to flood more frequently up to two hours per day in the upcoming years [2],
[3].
The United States and more specifically, the DOD, has spearheaded the response to climate
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security (national security for climate-related threats) by targeting infrastructure improve-
ments on installations [2]. Amongst the international community, the U.S. has gained more
credibility on emissions reduction by stagnating the effects of climate change with focus
on energy resilience [2]. Energy resilience to the DOD is the “ability to anticipate, prepare
for, and adapt to changing conditions and withstand, respond to, and recover rapidly from
disruptions” [5]. One tangible solution to energy resilience on DOD bases is microgrids.
Microgrids are a series of interconnected loads that perform a strategic operation of mission
sustainability by implementing renewable energy and non-greenhouse gas-emitting power
generation sources, fossil fuel generation sources, and energy storage which reduces or elim-
inates reliance on an external commercial power grid [4]. The Naval Facilities Engineering
Command (NAVFAC) has developed a microgrid design guide that stems from the DOD’s
interest in promulgating this type of technology to military installations. First introduced
to DOD bases in 2011 with a pilot program on collaborative energy security, microgrids
are a very useful tool in assuring energy security and mission integrity in order to preserve
national security [4], [6]. Currently, a Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)-led Navy Shore
Energy Technology Transition and Integration (NSETTI) project supported by NAVFAC,
EXWC has begun simulated testing of microgrid supporting equipment to a naval facility
in Rota, Spain [7]. In addition, civilian laboratories such as Lincoln Laboratory at the Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology have been researching and developing a tool specifically
designed for the military to allow energy managers to balance needs of critical loads and
national security missions to create an energy resilient solution that is cost-effective [8].
Reliable power on DOD installations is not only important to combat climate change
but is paramount for national security missions. National security has recently developed
to encompass a non-military meaning: energy security [9]. Energy security, and more
specifically energy resilience which is defined as one of the Department of the Navy (DoN)’s
three pillars of energy security, is constantly at risk of internal and external threats causing
disruptions [10]. DOD energy systems including microgrids have many threats that are
comparable in the civilian sector including natural disasters (possibly induced by climate
change) and equipment malfunction. However, a number of malicious threats are unique to
DOD microgrids. Therefore, the heightened importance of power to DOD installations for
national security missions invites a unique threat profile that is different than civilian grid
and microgrid infrastructure [11]. Malicious threat examples include adversaries tampering
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with machinery, causing explosions, and targeted cyber-attacks. Over the past decade, the
increase of cyber-attacks on power grids in the United States has surged to 50,000 per
year [4]. This drastic increase raises concern with DERs due to operation and control being
performed remotely with industrial control systems and advanced information technology.
A global current event of this type of vulnerability is the attacks on the Ukrainian Power
Grid that affected up to 225,000 people and hindered national security against hostile
nations [12]. This exemplifies the concern of reliable power to DOD installations to uphold
national security and enhance energy resilience.
This research embraces the interest and motivation of the above described DOD microgrid
initiatives and explores the bounds of nanogrids which are a more localized form of DER
with similar operations and components as microgrids. As a new form of technology in the
early stages of development, I focus on a methodology for implementing nanogrids into ex-
isting microgrids on DOD installations using a Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE)
approach. A measure of resilience is used within the research to compare the microgrid
and nanogrid models against various threats specific to the military as aforementioned:
cyber-attack, weather, intentional manipulation and sabotage, explosion, etc. In addition,
an existing model is used to test resilience of each nanogrid and microgrid type against a
specific threat to evaluate energy resilience. With the DOD initiative to have 25% of all
power used on DOD installations originating from renewable generation with either solar
or wind power by 2025, this type of technology and research is critical [6].
To describe where the methodology developed in the research falls within the enterprise of
Systems Engineering, the “Vee” Model is used for clarification. The Vee Model is a tool
used to display the progression of systems engineering activities throughout the stages of
the system’s life-cycle [13]. This progression begins with user needs in the upper left hand
corner and ends with a user-validated system in the upper right-hand side [13]. Figure 1.1
displays this progression, highlighting where my methodology fits in with the system life-
cycle of the microgrid with nanogrid implementation [13]. An assumption of this research is
that amicrogrid has gone through system verification and validation and is in operation. This
research exploits the upgrade phase of the microgrid system life-cycle with nanogrids by
incorporating its own system “Vee” Model. The methodology developed to assess energy
resilience will highlight the requirements and architecture phase of the nanogrid “Vee”
Model.
3
In summary, my methodology exists within the requirements and architecture phase of a
nanogrid “Vee” Model, which is then used to exploit the upgrade phase of a microgrid
“Vee” Model.
Figure 1.1. Vee Model: The process of where the researcher’s methodology
fits into the life-cycle of an operating microgrid and potentially upgraded
with a nanogrid system using its own “Vee” model. Methodology developed
is outlined in red for the Requirements and Architecture phase of the nanogrid
system life-cycle.
Novel research of nanogrids in Chapter 2 excludes commercial obstacles and pivots toward
military specific nanogrid implementation. Currently in review, Chapter 2 is a manuscript
written for Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute’s special issue of “Advances in
Ancillary Services by DRES in Distribution Grids” in the Applied Sciences journal [1].
This thesis approach uses the Systems Engineering Department at the NPS guidance in
the “System Engineering Theses: A Manuscript Option” document [14]. The ambitions of
this research are to address the benefits of a more localized form of energy distribution
(nanogrids) in order to spark interest for future research and eventual implementation at
current and future DOD installations. In addition to background information and related
research, Chapter 2 highlights the development of the methodology and incorporates a case




2.1 Investigation of Nanogrids for Improved Navy Instal-
lation Energy Resilience
A version of this chapter was published as: Alissa R. Kain, Douglas L. Van Bossuyt, 
and Anthony Pollman, “Investigation of Nanogrids for Improved Navy Installation Energy 
Resilience,” Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute’s special issue on Advances in 
Ancillary Services by DRES in Distribution Grids, Applied Sciences, Vol. 11, No. 9, 
pp. 4298, May 2021, ISSN 2076-3417, (DOI): https://doi.org/10.3390/app11094298.
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License 
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the 




Many militaries such as the United States DOD and the United States Navy (USN) heavily 
rely on uninterrupted electrical power to execute national security missions. With ap-
proximately 800 DOD military installations around the world, the supply of electricity is 
paramount in order to maintain operations [15]. The supply of power to loads that support 
national security missions (critical loads) must be maintained [16]. In the civilian sector, 
uninterrupted power is important for human safety and survival in extreme weather con-
ditions, and losing power in other conditions can have significant economic impacts (e.g., 
losing in-process product, losing production over the duration of the outage, production 
re-start costs, etc.).
Recent events have exemplified the need for a more localized energy generation and storage 
system to reduce vulnerabilities such as centralized generators failing due to extreme cold 
weather or transmission lines going offline due to wildfires. For instance, in February 2021 
the state of Texas experienced a near catastrophic failure to its power grid due to severe 
cold weather. Rolling blackouts issued by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas 
(ERCOT) was deemed vital to prevent a worst case scenario from occurring where 
“demand for power overwhelms the supply of power generation available on the grid, 
causing equipment to catch fire, substations to blow, power lines to go down” [17]. 
California has seen public safety power shutoffs to millions of electrical customers in 
recent years due to fire weather events where transmission lines can be turned off in order 
to prevent potential wildfires [18].
Already, many DOD and DoN bases, and other global military bases have microgrids to 
allow for base-level generation, storage, and consumption of energy during events that 
cause a base to be disconnected from the larger grid which improves base energy 
resilience [16]. However, events that occur within a base perimeter (e.g., airplane crash, 
adversary action, stored munitions explosion, fire, etc.) can disrupt, disable, or destroy a 
base microgrid which can cause critical loads necessary to support national security 
missions to be un-served even when grid power is available [19]. One potential avenue to 
improve energy availability to critical loads on military bases is nanogrids where highly 
localized generation, storage, and consumption of electricity is implemented to allow for 
individual critical loads to continue to be served even when microgrids go down.
Efficiency, reliability, and resilience (sometimes called resiliency in certain DoN source doc-
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uments) are the three pillars of energy security defined byDoN andNAVFAC issuances [10].
The desire to increase energy security ushered in a new age of smart grid infrastructure
for DOD installations and installations of other militaries with a focus on developing base
microgrids. DOD installations ashore are defined as secure land locations where the main-
taining and projecting of war-fighting strength is critical for executing national security
missions to preserve the United States of America’s national defense [20]. Microgrids have
been used in many DOD installations to improve resilience and reliability [4]. Resilience,
defined by the NAVFAC as “the ability to respond, adapt, and recover from a disturbance”
is the focal pillar of energy security for this research [10]. In general, DOD microgrids
aim for either 7 or 14 days of grid independence where only local generation and storage
resources can support critical loads [4]. However, current DOD and DoN guidance (in-
cluding NAVFAC guidance) has not addressed potential disruptions occurring to microgrid
infrastructure. In addition to the three pillars of energy security, DOD has mandated that
25% of all power used on bases be renewably generated by 2025 which is often achieved by
some combination of solar and wind power [6].
Microgrids are considered one of the key building blocks of current and future ashore and
military power infrastructure. Hallmarks of microgrids include local energy generation and
storage resources that are connected to loads within a clear microgrid system boundary
such as an installation perimeter [21]. Many military microgrids also have the ability to
connect and disconnect from the larger grid as needed [21]. Nanogrids take the concept
of local energy generation, storage, and consumption one step smaller by drawing the
system boundary around only a few or even just one load and associated generation and
storage equipment. Some nanogrid implementations (and of most interest to militaries)
are connected to microgrids via one or more switches that allow a nanogrid to share its
generation and storage capabilities with the larger microgrid during normal operations, and
disconnect from the microgrid to preserve the ability to serve local loads during a microgrid
disruption.
DoN and other navies have experience operating shipboard power systems that are similar in
scope and goal to nanogrids in the form of zonal distribution systems that localize generation
and consumption of power aboard a ship. One of the goals of zonal distribution is providing
uninterrupted power to critical loads and/or zones in a ship so that the ship’s mission
may continue even after a disruptive event (e.g., equipment failure, battle damage and
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compartment flooding, cyber-attacks, etc.) has occurred. The surface Navy has implemented
zonal distribution systems where Direct Current (DC) zonal shipboard electrical systems are
configured on ships with the sole purpose of ship survivability which is a similar concept to
resilience in shore-side electrical systems. System survivability of zonal distribution focuses
on detection and isolation of disturbances which is done by reconfiguration management
[22]. Because of the success of zonal distribution, DoN and DOD are both interested in
implementing the concept ashore using nanogrids.
2.2.1 Specific Contributions
This paper contributes a systems engineering method to analyze existing military installa-
tion (e.g., a DoN ashore installation, an Army base, etc.) microgrid infrastructure from the
perspective of improving energy resilience for critical loads specifically using nanogrid tech-
nology. The method helps to elucidate potential benefits of targeted nanogrid deployments
to critical loads at military installations which are important to national security. Additional
benefits may be realized by implementing nanogrids such as improving installation energy
independence among others.
2.3 Background and Related Research
This section provides background on several topics that are needed to understand the
contribution of this paper. Further, related research is discussed and gaps are identified
which this paper aims to fill.
2.3.1 Military Microgrids
Many military bases and other critical facilities have or are in the process of implement-
ing microgrids, at least in part in an attempt to provide reliable energy to critical loads.
Microgrids on many military bases generally perform six key functions for the attached
critical loads including: 1) stepping down high voltage power received from the main utility
grid to intermediate and/or low voltage, 2) distribute energy to critical and non-critical
loads, and connect other electrical hardware, 3) generate energy locally (e.g., diesel gensets,
Photovoltaic (PV) arrays, wind turbines, etc.), 4) store energy (e.g., battery banks, pump-
storage hydro, etc.), 5) control the flow of energy, the generation, the storage, and the loads
throughout the microgrid using one or more controllers to automatically operate electrical
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equipment, 6) step up and down voltage (transformers) and convert energy from AC to DC
or vice versa (inverters and converters) [23], [24]. The main components of a microgrid
often include diesel generators and other fossil fuel generators; PV, wind turbines, and other
renewable energy sources; energy storage systems such as battery banks; Points of Common
Coupling (PCC) where the microgrid connects to the utility grid (generally with a switch
to allow for operation of the microgrid while disconnected from the utility); one or more
control systems (often involving Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) sys-
tems); and switches, converters, inverters, relays, transformers, power lines (above ground,
underground, etc.), and other related hardware.
An established PCC and other requisite hardware (grid-forming generation and/or storage,
generation, local controller(s), etc.) provides one of the primary benefits of microgrids
for military bases and other critical facilities. The PCC provides the ability to disconnect
from the main utility grid, called “island-mode” [25], and continue uninterrupted service of
critical loads. In island-mode, loads critical to a military base’s primary mission functions
(the critical loads) are still provided power from local generation and storage sources
[25]. Issuances and instructions from organizations within militaries such as the NAVFAC
generally state that in order for military bases to perform their missions, energy security
of critical loads must be ensured regardless of the state of the grid beyond the PCC and
outside of the microgrid system boundary [4]. One way of identifying critical loads in
the United States military is the Mission Assurance and Continuity of Operations plan for
DOD installations which instructs that the essential buildings needed to conduct national
security missions based on criteria identified by the individual branches of the military (e.g,
DoN, etc.) and the installation mission must continue to receive power even during utility
disruptions (e.g., external power to a base is cut) [4].
Military microgrids have found several benefits in use including integrating smart grid
technologies, reducing peak load and losses by enhancing integration of DERs (often
including diesel gensets, wind turbines, micro hydro generation, fuel cells, PV, and other
generation sources), localizing power quality and reliability for end-user satisfaction, and
supporting the utility grid by managing sensitive loads and variability of DERs [21], [26].
Currently military microgrids are allowing the interconnection of loads and DER that can
replace duplicitive and expensive-to-maintain small Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS)
and stand-alone backup generators [21]. The flexible architecture of microgrids eases the
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employment of DER in conjunction with controllable loads and storage devices [26], [27].
2.3.2 Nanogrids
Nanogrids are generally much smaller thanmicrogrids.While an averagemilitary microgrid
may serve several dozens or hundreds of loads and operate in the 5-500 megawatt range,
nanogrids often serve on the order of one to five loads and a few kilowatts up to 5–10
megawatts. Nanogrids generally are technologically simpler than microgrids because they
only serve a single building or a few loads [28]. The smaller, simpler design of nanogrids
usually allows power production to occur much closer to the point of consumption versus
grid infrastructure and even military microgrids which sometimes can encompass many
hundreds of square kilometers of service territory. Generation occurring at the point of use
significantly reduces the potential negative effects of transmission and distribution lines
such as loss of efficiency, single point of failure, etc. [29]. Certain nanogrid configurations
(discussed later) where the nanogrid is connected to a microgrid or grid via its own PCC
can be very fault-tolerant where they are able to successfully transition to island-mode and
continue serving critical loads until microgrid and/or grid power is restored. Many of the
same benefits found with the implementation of military microgrids are expected to be
realized with the deployment of nanogrids on military bases.
It is important to note common technical characteristics of nanogrids. Nanogrid voltage
levels are often lower than microgrids and often are in the 100–500 volt range for both
AC and DC nanogrids. Power generation and consumption is often much smaller in a
nanogrid than a microgrid with ranges from 1 watt for the smallest nanogrids powering
extremely small loads up to 1 megawatt; however, the upper limit can vary and is defined
by the entity implementing the nanogrid [30]. Typical nanogrid loads are on the scale of
a single appliance or computer up to a building [28]. Nanogrids can sometimes be used
to improve electrical efficiency by 5%–13% in some residential applications versus other
options [30]. A common nanogrid system architecture uses DC because using DC can be
more efficient due to many nanogrid power sources producing DC power and many storage
systems (Energy Storage System (ESS)) using DC power which results in fewer inverters
and converters [29], [30]. However, while DC nanogrids can increase efficiency, they also
come with the consequence of needing enhanced protection against short circuit line faults
and ground faults [29]. The mitigation of faults is done with arching-type circuit breakers
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or more advance tactics that involve special mechanical circuit breakers that open against
fault currents by forcing currents to zero by external means to extinguish arcs [31].
2.3.3 Energy Resilience
The focus of this paper is on improving energy resilience of military bases, and specifically
for critical loads, through the implementation of nanogrids. In order to understand the
amount of improvement in resilience a proposed nanogrid may have over existing microgrid
infrastructure, a working definition of resilience in this context and a quantitative means of
measuring resilience must be defined.
Rather than adopting a civilian-focused energy resilience definition and quantification, it
is important to first understand the value of and difference in resilience from a military
perspective. Civilian grid systems often focus on defining resilience in terms of real dollars
lost when energy supply does not meet demand and a facility stops production of something
that is easily monetized (e.g., steel, automobiles, computer chips, processed food, vaccines,
etc.) [32]. Conversely, military energy systems such as nanogrids and microgrids produce
something less tangible: national security [33]. National security is intangible and has no
easily defined value [33], [34]. The cost to national security due to lack of energy resilience
becomes subjective and theoretical [35].
There are a variety of definitions of energy resilience within military communities although
they all focus on several commonalities: preparing for an event, riding out the event,
stabilizing after the event, and recovering from the event in order to continue to support
mission essential operations and maintain readiness [19], [36]. The military definitions of
energy resilience generally align with civilian definitions although the military definitions
always tie back to the mission of national security [19], [37]. Thus this paper adopts the
definition of energy resilience from a military perspective as encompassing the ability of an
energy system to support critical loads before an event, during an event, immediately after
an event, and in the recovery from an event back to a normal operating state.
There have been several attempts to quantify energy resilience for military purposes from a
financial perspective. For instance, a cost benefit analysis of stand-alone diesel generators
attached to critical loads on installations was performed to calculate a Customer Damage
Function (CDF) which is representative of the cost of interruption as a function of the
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duration of an outage [32], [38]. However, in most situations it is very difficult to quantify
national security in a dollar amount. Instead, within the United States military, the value of
resilience is sometimes defined using the Mission Dependency Index (MDI) where MDI
captures the relative criticality of various infrastructure on a base with respect to the mission
of the tenant organizations on a base on a 0–100 scale with 100 being absolutely critical [39].
In contrast, some researchers have criticized the use ofMDIwhen directly ranking criticality
of loads to their overall role in national security missions. These researchers claim existence
of inaccuracies in addressing time dependency of corrective actions, and misrepresentation
of mission interdependence and intradependence in the MDI equation [40]. Recently the
DoN has begun using Resilient Energy Program Office (REPO) (an attempt to address
the shortcomings of MDI with similar objectives and using aspects of Energy Security
Assessment Tool (ESAT)) as a replacement in someof the roles thatMDI has been previously
employed [41]. However, many organizations across the United States federal government
retain MDI and some issues with REPO are currently being identified. Thus, this paper
adopts MDI as the base measure of a unit of energy resilience.
In order to use MDI to quantify energy resilience for the military, a method of quantifying
resilience over time is needed. Several exist or are in development [19], [33], [37], [42],
[43]. This paper adopts the approach proposed by Peterson et al. [33] where the Expected
Electrical Distribution Mission Impact (EEDMI) quantifies the resilience of an energy
system versus all expected initiating events, threats, disruptions, etc. In Peterson et al.’s
approach, MDI is used to understand the value of each critical load to national security
where it provides the input to Mission Impact (MI) on a per unit time (T) basis. MI is the
impact to a mission on a per unit time basis for if a specific electrical load is not served. A
single scenario (specific initiating event, threat, etc.), "B, is defined by the MI per unit time





During normal operations and with no electrical interruptions,"B is zero. During a scenario
where MDI = 50, the unit of time is hours, and power is not delivered for 2 hours, "B = 100.
In scenarios where not enough power is available to serve all loads, load shedding occurs.
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The details of how load shedding occurs (e.g., which loads are shed first, rotating blackouts,
etc.) is dependent upon behavior of the energy system and controller(s). In such situations
where load shedding occurs, "B > 0 which indicates an impact to national security and
thus warrants further investigation.
The aggregate of all scenarios (() calculated in Equation 2.1 is EEDMI which includes the




%A (( = B)"B (2.2)
The total EEDMI value for a specific electrical system configuration is used as a way to
compare between different potential electrical system architectures from the perspective
of energy resilience. A lower EEDMI value is more desirable because it means that the
electrical system is less susceptible to initiating events and threats disrupting power to
critical loads [37]. The process of developing EEDMI is the same whether analyzing a very
small nanogrid or a very large microgrid on a military base.
2.3.4 Mission Threats
Threats to the uninterrupted delivery of energy to critical loads on a military base are called
a variety of terms such as initiating events, mission threats or threats, disruptions, etc.
While there are well-understood and well-quantified initiating events available for external
threats (events that occur outside a facility) and internal threats (events that occur inside
a facility) [44], many threats of specific interest to the military are unique to military
installations and not included in existing resources. For instance, a nation-state adversary
conducting a coordinated cyber-attack and physical attack against a variety of electrical
infrastructure both internal and external to a facility is generally not considered in most
existing initiating event handbooks. In the Methodology section of this paper we propose a
minimum list of potential initiating events of interest to the military.
2.3.5 Nanogrid System Design
A variety of nanogrid system designs are proposed in the literature and have seen limited
implementation in the real world. Different nanogrid designs can serve different purposes
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and will have different impacts on the energy resilience of an electrical system. From
a systems engineering perspective, Giachetti et al. advances six criteria for understanding
electrical systems used to powermilitary loads: 1) SystemPurpose 2) Stakeholders 3) System
Boundaries 4) Functional Requirements 5) System Architecture 6) Operating Modes [16].
In this paper, the nanogrid system’s purpose is to improve resilience, transmission effi-
ciency, and ease of integration of renewable resource and energy storage. Though nanogrid
resilience has not been validated, our analyses (detailed in subsequent sections) indicate that
nanogrids do improve resilience over baseline microgrid infrastructure in many situations.
Military nanogrid stakeholders include base commanders, tenant commands, local energy
companies, microgrid providers and contractors, and maintenance and funding organi-
zations. Higher authorities that base commands report to (e.g., The Pentagon) are also
impacted by nanogrids.
We view the physical and functional boundaries of a microgrid from a holistic perspective.
The system includes physical equipment, processes, software, and people who sustaining
operational effectiveness (e.g., maintenance, operations, supply chain, etc.). Nanogrid sys-
tem boundaries differ frommicrogrid system boundaries in that nanogrids are much smaller
than microgrids. However, individual nanogrids can be part of a larger microgrid from the
perspective of a Systems of Systems (SoS). By considering several nanogrids as part of a
SoS, individual nanogrids can be placed on various critical loads within a microgrid to work
together to improve the microgrid’s energy resilience. Nanogrids generally have external
inputs from maintenance organizations, fuel providers, operator organization, a microgrid,
and the external grid.
The primary functional requirements from a systems engineering perspective of nanogrids
are to generate, distribute, control distribution, and store energy. Where lower level func-
tions under generate energy include generate electrical energy and adjust energy production.
Distribute energy includes transmit energy, control energy flow, and convert energy. Con-
trolling a nanogrid includes measure nanogrid state, process measurements for control
decisions, and send control signals. Energy storage provides the benefit of stability of the
nanogrid system when energy demand exceeds energy generation capacity. This includes
store energy, release energy, and adjust energy flow.
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System Architecture for a nanogrid differs from a microgrid due to its complexity and
potential configurations. We suggest specific system architecture details of any individual
nanogrid be determined after an analysis of alternative existing nanogrid architectures is
conducted in order to identify which type(s) of nanogrid architecture(s) best benefit the
energy resilience of any specific military installation.
Nanogrid operating modes include four primary modes of operation: microgrid-connected,
transition-to-island, island, and re-connection. Microgrid-connected mode establishes nor-
mal parallel operations with the microgrid and (assuming a microgrid-to-grid PCC) utility
grid while all distributed resources in the grid operate within IEEE standards and infor-
mation is exchanged with the nanogrid controller. Transition-to-island mode represents the
nanogrid’s transient state of transition between being connected to the microgrid and being
fully islanded. The nanogrid must have sufficient energy storage available in addition to
the ability to stabilize voltage and frequency (in the case of an AC or AC/DC nanogrid)
for successful transition. A major concern of this mode is the dampening of transients in
the nanogrid to avoid tripping protective devices [16]. Island mode is when the nanogrid
is operating independent of any outside energy sources, and loads are solely supported by
DER and ESS with the responsibility to maintain set frequency and voltage parameters [16].
Re-connection mode is the transition period where the nanogrid is reconnected to the mi-
crogrid. Before synchronization can occur, the frequency, voltage, and phase angle between
the two must be within acceptable parameters in order for the nanogrid and microgrid to
resume unified operations [16].
2.3.6 Nanogrid Architectural Configurations from a Resilience Per-
spective
A number of major architectural configurations have been proposed in the literature and
some have been implemented on a limited basis. This section discusses some of the con-
siderations of nanogrid architectural configurations from a resilience perspective and from
the perspective of other important military requirements such as efficiency and renewable
energy.
The conflict is that many authors design nanogrid infrastructure differently: with central-
ized and decentralized control systems, the sole use of DC power, or a hybrid of DC-AC
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\ AC-DC power conversions. Currently no actionable guidance exits on potential nanogrid
configurations that may improve resilience of critical loads to outages on military installa-
tions. However, commercial solutions that stem from the demand for electrical power for
space applications have led to similar refinement of existing technologies for nanogrid-like
solutions. Similar to nanogrids, these new technologies address power conversion from PV
arrays with management, regulation, and monitoring of electrical demand. Though these
power systems are not specifically called nanogrids, their basic elements are similar: en-
ergy storage, power conversion, power management and distribution, and use by spacecraft
systems [45]. Further, the details of critical loads vary from installation to installation; thus,
there is no one size fits all solution.
Research has investigated the benefits and drawbacks of implementing both AC and DC
nanogrids which highlights the difference in cost between DC nanogrids (high up-front
costs) and AC nanogrids (low up-front costs) [29]. Though we explicitly do not consider
cost within our research, it is important to note the added cost to augment existing military
microgrid infrastructure with DC nanogrids. Some research has recently been focused on
understanding the cost of increasing energy resilience from amilitary perspective [37], [46].
While some military energy organizations are primarily driven by cost, we expect that cost
will soon be balanced with energy resilience to better align with the high-level desire to
assure that important national security missions can continue in spite of disruptions to grid
and microgrid infrastructure.
Safety is another concern with military requirements and therefore protection concerns arise
when choosing DC nanogrid architecture. Short circuit line and ground faults are more
common at output terminals for DC nanogrid architecture then Alternating Current (AC)
nanogrid [29]. Examples of this are seen in Okinawa, Japan with experimentation done by
researchers to stabilize DC power on nanogrids with three sets of bidirectional DC to DC
converters (used in current and voltage regulated mode) to maintain a constant bus voltage
[28]. In addition, mitigation of these potential failuremodes can occur with the use of arcing-
type circuit breakers or more advanced strategies [29]. Control strategies and control system
design can have a large impact on a variety of important nanogrid requirements. Nanogrid
architectures using either centralized or decentralized control provide different solutions to
optimize power production and consumption to better match a load’s supply and load curves,
and reduce the negative effects of intermittency [29]. Centralized control at the microgrid
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level (controlling the microgrid plus any constituent nanogrids) enables a cohesive control
strategy of system dynamics but provides a potential single point of failure. Though cohesion
is important, militaries are generally more concerned about reliability and resilience. In
addition, when a microgrid is under stress, the purpose of the nanogrid is to independently
disconnect from the microgrid at its PCC and operate as an independent system in island
mode. Therefore, centralized control strategies are undesirable formostmilitary applications
and decentralized nanogrid control systems that can react to threats to the uninterrupted
delivery of power to critical loads is important for energy security and improves resilience.
However, decentralized control of nanogrids can inhibit overall microgrid reliability due to
there being many more potential independent failures of distributed nanogrid controllers
over time [29], [47].
A benefit of a DC nanogrid is the commonality of PV array and ESS output power generally
beingDC power [29]. This commonality of a DC based nanogrid would allow for a smoother
and efficient transition of power amongst renewable energy sources to battery storage.
Though an AC based nanogrid will save money on initial cost upfront with no necessary
retrofitting, added efficiency benefits of a DC based nanogrid will outweigh initial capital
required criteria and benefit the military’s mission-focused requirements.
2.3.7 Related Research
Existing research into and deployment of nanogrid technologies to date have generally not
directly focused on the ability of nanogrids to support critical loads from the perspective of
energy resilience and especially for military base applications. As far as we are aware, no
one has proposed using nanogrids from the perspective of improving resilience of critical
loads that support national security. The majority of current nanogrid research focuses on
conceptual nanogrid design and defining nanogrid infrastructure. Only a few publications
have reported on nanogrids successfully implemented in real-world conditions. For instance,
a nanogrid was implemented in a housing community in Okinawa, Japan where it was found
that a decentralized DC-DC solution was beneficial [28]. However, the authors noted that
additional research is needed to explore limitations of decentralization and the development
of higher level intelligent exchange strategies that enhance efficiency [28].
Enhancing efficiency of nanogrids (an important aspect of energy security for militaries)
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occupies a significant portion of the existing literature where identified challenges include
protocols, demand-sidemanagement, security, and the self-control of the overall system [48].
One promising area of research is fully DC-based nanogrids where higher efficiency, better
power quality, and better stability is achieved versus other options and may contribute
significantly to energy security as a result [29].
Asmentioned previously, a similar concept toDCnanogrids is zonal distribution (sometimes
referred to as zonal shipboard power) which is implemented on a growing number of vessels
in many Surface Navies. Zonal distribution uses DC power architecture in order to avoid
some of the issues associated with AC power architecture such as generator sets working
at fixed speed that limit fuel efficiency, reactive power flow and power quality problems,
bulky conventional transformers, and challenges associated with supporting pulsed electric
loads which will become increasingly common on Navy ships [49].
In addition, current research in nanogrids fails to support a mission-focused objective for
DOD shore installations and instead supports a commercial cost effective mission with
an ease of integration to existing infrastructure. Current research suggested the pursuit of
future work in resilience of smart load configurations, networks and connections, and fast
response to disasters [29], [50]. This segues into the uniqueness of our research where we
propose a methodological approach to enhance resilience of mission critical loads to create
greater energy security that in turn supports the mission of national security.
2.4 Methodology
This section introduces a systems engineering method to investigate if nanogrids can in-
crease the resilience of critical loads on military installations and lower the mission impact
from potential threats. Figure 2.1 illustrates the method.
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Figure 2.1. This methodology is created for base energy managers to follow,
starting with the collection of system information and ending with final design
recommendations.
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2.4.1 Step 1: Collect System Information
The first step in the proposed methodology is to collect system information that is necessary
for subsequent steps. The requisite information is generally readily available to base energy
managers and others involved with energy systems at military installations.
Step 1.1: Develop Nanogrid System Information
Basic information about potential nanogrids must first be developed following Giachetti et
al.’s six criteria for understanding electrical systems that power military loads including:
1) System Purpose 2) Stakeholders 3) System Boundaries 4) Functional Requirements 5)
System Architecture 6) Operating Modes [16]. This information is useful to ensure accurate
and explicit communications between all stakeholders (e.g., base energy managers, tenant
commands, critical load owners, etc.) and helps to elucidate the architectural process to find
weaknesses and validate checkpoints within the grid development [51]. We advocate that
this information is captured in a MBSE tool such as Papyrus, Magic Draw, Innoslate, etc.
which helps with later analysis.
As part of developing the information for Giachetti et al.’s six criteria, stakeholder needs are
elicited. The stakeholder needs are then developed into requirements whichwill be used later
in a decision matrix to help judge different nanogrid configurations for suitability. Potential
requirements include but are not limited to efficiency, reliability, ease of integration, and
communication cohesion.
Step 1.2: Collect Solar, Critical Load, and Current Microgrid Data
Next, site-specific information is collected which will help a base energy manager to un-
derstand the feasibility of implementing nanogrids on specific critical loads. Data collected
include load profile data, solar irradiance data, existing energy generation and storage sys-
tems including support infrastructure (e.g.: fuel storage tanks, etc.), existing microgrid
power infrastructure (e.g., transmission lines, switches, protection equipment, transformers,
feeder lines, PCC, etc.), and other related information.
Data such as site-specific historical solar irradiance information is used in later steps to
better size PV generation assets for nanogrids. Load profile data is used to understand the
average and peak loads, and how much energy is needed over the course of a potential
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outage scenario. We recommend that load data be collected over at least the course of one
year and indeed this data is often available for many years from existing SCADA systems.
Step 1.3: Define Critical Loads and MDI Scores
The next step is to define the importance of various loads in relation to national security. We
suggest using MDI [39] which is a unitless measure that can be tied to the importance of a
specific load to national security in spite of the imperfections in the measure [40]. As other
better measures become available, they can be substituted for MDI. These scores become
theMI used in Peterson et al.’s method [33] which is implemented later in this methodology.
It is important to note that all loads within this case study are considered critical. Further, the
responsibility of assigning an MDI value lies with the base energy manager and installation
leadership.When a base energymanager or installation leadership deem that a load has no or
very low MDI, it can likely be ignored as being unimportant to national security. We do not
recommend a specific cutoff value for low MDI scores; however, in some situations where
there are many loads and challenges exist identifying true critical loads, a pre-established
cutoff value may be justified. For instance, the loads associated with a recreational facility
are likely not critical to national security and thus will have a very low MDI score while
the loads associated with a radar system may be very critical to national security and then
are expected to have a very high MDI score. The loads that are deemed critical can then be
carried forward through the rest of the methodology.
Step 1.4: Size Potential DER Configurations for Specific Critical Loads
Next a preliminary high-level DER sizing study is performed for each critical load with the
assumption that each critical load will be placed on its own nanogrid. This includes sizing
both energy generation and storage (e.g., how large of a diesel generator? How large of a
PV array? How much diesel storage? How large of a battery storage system? etc.) to meet
the maximum outage duration a military base is mandated to be able to sustain (e.g., 7 days,
14 days, etc.) which often indicates how long a mission must continue at a specific military
base before a different base elsewhere that is not impacted by the initiating event or realized
threat can start performing the mission.
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We suggest picking a time period with very low solar irradiance and very high load if
such a period exists for a specific site location and a specific load profile. For instance, in
northern hemisphere locations, the December-January period often combines very low solar
irradiance due to short, cloudy days and higher load profiles due to systems needing more
energy to function in cold, dark conditions. However, it is possible that summer conditions
in very hot climates may have high enough load profiles due to cooling needs (i.e., chillers
and air conditioners to keep electronics within operating temperatures, etc.) that even with
more solar irradiance to generate more PV energy, this time period is the most extreme load
versus generation scenario.
2.4.2 Step 2: Develop and Down-Select Nanogrid Architectures
In this step, potential nanogrid architectures are developed and down-selected based on
site-specific and stakeholder-specific conditions.
Step 2.1: Evaluate Potential Nanogrid Architectures
As discussed above, there are a variety of nanogrid architectures available. In this step,
evaluation of potential nanogrid architectures to serve critical loads at a specific military
base is performed. We suggest using a Pugh matrix approach although a variety of other
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) methods are available to the practitioner. The Pugh matrix
criteria map to the requirements developed in Step 1.1. The Pugh matrix is a type of tool that
uses a scoring system of plus and minus to determine if the base energy manager’s intuition
of a baseline grid structure is the best decision. An example Pugh matrix is provided in
Table 2.4 in the Case Study (Chapter 2, Section 4).
Step 2.2: Develop One-Line Nanogrid and Microgrid Designs
Once the AoA is conducted a high-level one-line diagram of the microgrid and proposed
nanogrids can be developed. All critical loads, existing DER, other existing power infras-
tructure (e.g., power lines, transformers, etc.), and proposed nanogrids should be included.
This one-line diagram serves as the basis for further analysis within this method. Note that
at this point, we are interested in including all potential nanogrids as a down-select step to
choose which nanogrids should be implemented occurs later.
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Step 2.3: Develop Nanogrid Operational Concept View
In order to understand how various threats may impact the operation of a microgrid and
associated nanogrids, we advocate developing an operational concept view that is commonly
used throughout many military organizations [52]. The operational concept view combines
information such as geographic location of energy infrastructure and critical loads, the
one-line diagram of the microgrid and associated nanogrids, locations of perimeter fences
and entry control points, and other site-specific information into one figure that allows for
better communication with stakeholders and permits more rapid human analysis of potential
threats. An example operational concept view is provided in the Case Study (Section 4) in
Figure 2.6.
2.4.3 Step 3: Analyze Threats to Base Energy Security
The method now proceeds to analyze potential threats to base energy security. These threats
comprise the initiating events that are used in subsequent methodology steps.
Step 3.1: Reference Baseline Threats
An analysis of threats is important for the base energy manager to ensure that the microgrid
and associated nanogrids are resilient against a variety of potential threats. Currently DOD
andNAVFAC consider islandmode as a primary threat from an energy resilience standpoint.
Island mode, where the base is cutoff from outside electrical energy for 14 days, serves as
the baseline threat scenario in subsequent steps of this methodology. In addition to island
mode, we advocate for inclusion a variety of additional internal and external threats of
specific interest to military installations that are subsequently discussed. While we believe
this is a reasonable minimum list of threats to consider, specific locations and specific
global and regional threat protection postures may require additional threats to be included
in subsequent methodology steps where they serve as initiating events.
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The following internal threats are the minimum set that we recommend a base energy
manager use:
Loss of Generator(s): This threat is the loss of one or more generators simultaneously.
Simultaneous failure (a common cause event) can happen due to contaminated diesel fuel
being delivered to all generator fuel bunkers or incorrect maintenance being performed on
all generators, for instance.
Loss of PV Array(s): Similar to the loss of generators threat, PV array maintenance could
have been mismanaged or there could be a design flaw across all installed PV panels or
controllers. Other ways a loss of PV array can occur is dirt or avian organic material on the
PV modules, shading, or incorrect incidence angle among others [53].
Maintenance Personnel Insider Threat: The DOD defines insider threat as “the threat
that an insider will use her or his authorized access, wittingly or unwittingly, to do harm to
the security of the United States” [54]. All militaries face a similar insider threat that can
compromise national security mission success. Two incidents of insider threats at United
States military bases include include Fort Hood in 2009 where an lone Army officer shot
and killed 13 people and in 2013 when an Navy contractor shot and killed 12 civilian
employees [54]. It is understood that military installations are not a perfectly safe sanctuary
and therefore it must be taken into consideration that, for instance, damaging PV arrays
or transformers with a gun, or generators by draining engine oil would be a potential
occurrence [54]. This type of deliberate attack is likely to occur against critical loads that
are most valuable to mission success.
The following external threats are the minimum set that we recommend a base energy
manager use:
Natural Disasters: Site-specific natural disasters must be included in potential exter-
nal threats. Such threats could include flooding, earthquake, tsunami, tornadoes, etc. We
specifically focus on fire and severe storms in this article, and provide more detail below on
the fire threat. Similar detail can be developed for each potential natural disaster based on
site-specific considerations.
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A 2013 study showed that the Northern California and Monterey Peninsula (where the
military base we work at is located) has an estimated 31–40% chance that given a single
source of ignition, a fire will grow to 100 plus acres in size [55]. This is the second highest
ranking category for fire growth within the United States. Given the severity and likelihood
of this natural disaster or ignition occurring by an attacker not only in the American west
but globally anywhere that a wild-land urban interface exists [56], we advocate this threat
be included. Indeed, the 2020 fire year saw three major fires within 30 miles of the military
bases in the greater Monterey Peninsula area [57].
Explosion from Terrorists: Since 1997 the Joint Chiefs of Staff implemented the Com-
bating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund which has allocated approximately $80 million
to U.S. and overseas installations for Anti-Terrorism Force Protection improvements [58].
Today, the probability of an explosion by a vehicle-born IED or other means of explosives
still exists. A heighten intent of disrupting military operations and comprising national
security makes military installations more favorable to this type of external event in com-
parison to civilian grid facilities. Terrorist attacks such as Beirut in 1983, September 11Cℎ
2001, and most recently in 2019 a vehicle borne IED outside the U.S. Embassy in eastern
Kabul have changed the paradigm of force protection on military installations [59], [60].
Fuel Delivery Disruption with Low Probability of Resupply: Disruption of Fuel
delivery may happen to any military installation. For instance, supply chain contracts and
limited refining capacity within the United States limit the DOD’s fuel supply domestically
with reliance on extensive supply chains from foreign suppliers [61]. A single natural
disaster not directly impacting a base can cause delay in fuel supply to base installations,
which is why this type of external event is considered as a more likely occurrence for
military installations. Other potential disruptions to fuel delivery such as protests blocking
shipments, adversary destruction of fuel tankers, and other scenarios are of particular
concern to military installations. Many military installations are heavily reliant on fuel
delivery to power generators that are expected to function in order to support critical loads
during an island mode situation.
The above internal and external threats are the minimal list of threats that we believe base
energy managers should use to assess their microgrid and proposed nanogrid architectures.
We take this opportunity to vigorously remind the practitioner that location-specific threats
25
either from a military installation itself or from natural or man-made phenomena locally or
regionally must also be considered. For example, a military installation such as 29 Palms in
the Mojave Desert has a higher probability of a rocket launched from the Mojave Spaceport
crashing into microgrid infrastructure than Naval Support Activity Monterey which is far
from any rocket launch trajectories. Another example is Camp Santiago in Puerto Rico and
Camp Lejeune in North Carolina where both installations have a higher probability of a
hurricane destroying microgrid and grid infrastructure due to the frequency of hurricanes
in their locations versus North American west coast facilities.
Step 3.2: Determine Percent Occurrence of Threat per Year
After a final set of threats are determined, the probability of occurrence of these events
initiating within any given year must be determined. In this methodology, probability of
occurrence is the likelihood over a given time frame (often one year) that a threat will be
realized. While natural disasters such as fires and floods have well-established probabilities
of occurrence in the literature, it can be challenging to ascertain the probability of occurrence
of human-caused threats such as insider threats or terrorist attacks [62].
While it maybe desirable for some military installations to examine rare threats, we rec-
ommend that a threat only be carried forward for further evaluation if the probability of
occurrence on a yearly basis is greater than 2% (%A (( = B) ≥ .02 ). If the potential threat
is below this threshold, then we suggest it can be disregarded based on our professional
experience. Existing sources of data and quantification process for probability of occurrence
for failure scenarios are challenging due to to information available for military installa-
tions. The base energy manager’s responsibility is to postulate probability of occurrence for
specific threats on the location of their base [33]. A variety of useful resources to develop
probability of occurrence of threats exists [63], [64]. It is important to note the limitations on
historical data due to climate change. Increasing climate changed has caused considerable
changes in weather patterns and poses risk to military installations. For instance, in 2019 the
Pentagon reported that a total of seventy-nine military installations were at risk of flooding
due to rising sea levels induced by climate change. Norfolk, one of the Navy’s largest bases,
is seeing the effects already. The main road to Norfolk Naval Station floods a few times a
month with predictions that it will continue to flood more frequently up to two hours per
day in the upcoming years [2], [3].
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Step 3.3: Develop Microgrid and Nanogrid Threat Scenarios
The operation concept view previously derived is beneficial when maturing microgrid and
nanogrid threat scenarios. After a threat has been realized (e.g., a fire), the damage that threat
inflicts on the microgrid and constituent nanogrid(s) must be catalogued for subsequent
analysis. In most of the threats we advocated above that base energy managers evaluate, the
location of the critical load and where the threat initiates can be used to determine what
nanogrid(s) and microgrid components are impacted, and what DER are still operational
when operating in island mode. We conservatively assume that when a threat is realized,
the microgrid disconnects from the utility grid at the PCC. We assert this is a conservative
and realistic assumption. Tables 2.6 and 2.7 in the Case Study (Section 4) demonstrate a
tabulation of equipment expected to be functional or offline/disabled/destroyed in a variety
of threat scenarios.
2.4.4 Step 4: Calculate Resilience
After sufficient information and models are constructed in the above steps, it is now possible
to calculate the energy resilience of various nanogrid configurations to various threats. This
will allow a comparison between nanogrid architectures, and against the baseline microgrid
architecture in a future step.
Step 4.1: Simulate Nanogrid Systems
Using the equations developed by Peterson et al. [33], a simulation can be developed to
examine various nanogrid configurations. We modified an existing MATLAB simulation
tool [43] to develop the Case Study (Section 4). Other implementations of Peterson et al.
have been developed [19].
The simulation implements a simple power flow analysis thatmatches generation and storage
with loads to identify periods of time where insufficient capacity is available to support
critical loads. Input parameters include sizing information for PV area, battery capacity and
power output, generator power output, amount of fuel storage available, solar irradiance
data, load data, and initial conditions of all electrical hardware. Output parameters include
load shedding information (which load(s) is/are shed, and for how long) among others. The
power flow analysis takes into account the charge state (modeling charge and discharge
rates, capacity, etc.) of the ESS, the amount of fuel available for generators and when fuel
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resupply may occur, load profiles, load shedding strategies (which loads to shed first when
insufficient power is available to support all loads), and other considerations. The output of
the simulation is then used along with individual MI scores of the critical loads to calculate
"B as shown in Equation 2.1.
We advocate using a one hour time step in the simulations which is sufficient for the high
level systems engineering analysis of energy resilience conducted in our methodology. Prac-
titioners can choose to develop higher fidelity models based on their individual situations
although we have observed in our professional practice that most military installation energy
managers can make decisions using data with one hour time steps.
While it is possible to simulate across one or multiple calendar years using a Monte Carlo
approach or similar (as Peterson et al. did [33]) to develop a broader picture of load
shedding under different load and solar irradiance conditions (e.g., diurnal temperature and
solar irradiance swings, seasonal swings, etc.), we recommend that one particular time
period with the highest loads and lowest solar irradience is specifically chosen. This greatly
reduces computation time and also focuses the analysis on the worst case scenario of high
load and low availability of solar power. The reason for this focus is that threats from
adversaries are likely to choose the time of greatest electrical infrastructure vulnerability
to attack. This is unique to military energy resilience and microgrids versus civilian energy
systems that generally do not have nation-state or terrorist adversaries looking to cause
damage to national security.
Step 4.2: Check for Unacceptable Load Shed
Once results for all threats have been developed, the results must be examined to determine
if any particular threat scenarios have unacceptably high load shed hours. While we use
"B to understand the overall contribution of a particular threat scenario to not completing
national security missions, it is important to look at the raw load shed data to verify any
particular load shed events of interest are not being obscured. If such a situation is found,
we advise returning to Step 1.3 to re-examine the MI score (likely directly derived from
MDI) to verify that information is correct. Occasionally, the MI may need to be manually
adjusted to reflect intangible factors that were not captured in the MDI analysis or similar
load-specific national security importance measure.
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Unacceptable load shed events may also indicate a need for an up-sized nanogrid design for
a specific load – in this case, return to Step 1.4. If individual load shed events are all within
acceptable parameters, then continue forward.
Step 4.3: Calculate Mission Impact Across All Threats
Next, mission impact across all threats is calculated using the EEDMI metric developed in
Equation 2.2. This involves using the probability of occurrence for each threat developed in
Step 3.2 and the results from Step 4.1. The EEDMI for each potential nanogrid architecture
can be compared against the baseline microgrid EEDMI score to determine if specific
architectures are better or worse than the baseline microgrid which is performed in the next
step. EEDMI is a measure of resilience of electrical energy to threats so that critical loads
at a military base can perform important national security missions.
2.4.5 Step 5: Analyze Results
Now EEDMI scores are analyzed to validate if adding nanogrids to an existing microgrid
improves resilience. Three outcomes may occur comparing EEDMI scores including:
" = 0: The most ideal scenario from a military energy resilience perspective is
when a specific system architecture returns a result of " = 0. This means that for all
postulated threats, no load shedding occurs and there is no impact to the national security
mission.
"%A>?>B43 (~BC4< < "0B4;8=4: In this case, the proposed nanogrid system
design is superior to the baseline microgrid because the proposed design’s " is less
than the baseline microgrid.
"%A>?>B43 (~BC4< ≥ "0B4;8=4: If the" of the proposed nanogrid system
design is greater than or equal to the baseline, it is worse than the baseline design with
respect to energy resilience. Such an outcome may indicate undersized generation and
storage capacity within the nanogrid(s). In this case, it may be worthwhile to double-check
the sizing carried out in Step 1.4 and the designs produced in Step 2.2.
The proposed nanogrid designs that produce " values below the baseline nanogrid
can then be rank-ordered to understand which designs may be preferential to others. While
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the " metric is useful in understandingwhich designs aremore resilient and aremore
likely to protect critical loads from threats to energy security that could impact national
security missions, resilience is only one of several important requirements that military
installations often use when focusing on improving energy infrastructure.
2.4.6 Step 6: Produce Final Design Recommendations
Now that a list of potential nanogrid design options has been produced and ordered based
on resilience, we turn our attention to producing final design recommendations that a base
energy manager can use to promote upgrading existing microgrid infrastructure to include
nanogrids. Two questions must be addressed to guide the final recommendations:
Are Stakeholder Requirements Met? It is important to ensure the requirements collected
in Step 1 are validated as being met. While the methodology presented above develops an
understanding of energy resilience, other important requirements must be verified to still
be met. For instance, a proposed design may only include diesel generators with no other
generation sources but a requirement for a certain percentage of renewable generation may
be present [6]. In such a case, this would indicate that particular nanogrid system design
is inappropriate for further consideration without extreme extenuating circumstances to
violate the renewable energy requirement. If no proposed designs remain after validating
other requirements are met, then the base energy manager should return to Step 1 and
carefully re-evaluate the requirements before verifying that no other proposed designs exist
which would meet requirements.
Is Funding Available? While a proposed nanogrid design may meet all requirements,
there may not be funding available to fully implement the proposed design on the existing
microgrid infrastructure. In this case, a base energy manager may choose to prioritize which
critical loads receive a nanogrid first based upon available funds and cost of installing and
commissioning the nanogrid(s). Depending upon the particulars of how military budgets
are allocated for projects such as base energy infrastructure upgrades, it may be possible to
fund a nanogrid for a critical load that is less critical than another critical load because of
the specific configuration of the two different nanogrids. In other words, if there is money
available to do a certain type of energy project (i.e., renewable energy projects [6], etc.) and
one proposed nanogrid design meets the criteria for that funding source while another does
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not, then the nanogrid design that meets the funding source requirements should be pursued.
When other funding becomes available, then other nanogrid designs can be pursued for other
critical loads. The complexities of funding for military energy projects is largely unique to
militaries and is not as pronounced in most civilian sectors.
2.5 Case Study
This section demonstrates how a practitioner such as a military base energy manager
may use the proposed methodology by introducing a fictionalized version of the Northern
California-located Naval Support Activity Monterey base where the Naval Postgraduate
School is located. The case study uses a generic base structure and focuses on location and
threat-specific initiating events. A potential nanogrid configuration is compared against an
existing fictionalized generic microgrid design to demonstrate the potential usefulness of
the method.
2.5.1 Step 1: Collect System Information
Step 1.1: Develop Nanogrid System Information
First, Giachetti et al.’s six criteria for understanding electrical systems from a systems
engineering perspective are collected. The system purpose is to deliver reliable power to
multiple critical loads on the Naval Support Activity Monterey military base. The stake-
holders include base energy manager, DOD employees, high ranking officials within the
base chain of command, NAVFAC, and the DOE. Figure 2.2 provides context to the base
energy infrastructure from a systems engineering perspective where the system boundary is
indicated by the dashed red line. Four external inputs to the internal system are the external
grid, fuel provider, maintenance organization, and operator organization. This step in the
systems engineering process aids in defining system boundaries to examine external inter-
actions that may effect the internal system environment. Labeled in blue are what material
or resource is provided by each external input.
The requirements analysis is illustrated in Figure 2.3where top level functional requirements
include: generate energy, distribute energy, control distribution, and store energy.
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Figure 2.2. Nanogrid Context Diagram. This diagram is useful in the context
of the systems engineering process to identify external interactions with the
system and identify system boundaries [16].
Figure 2.3. Microgrid and Nanogrid Functional Decomposition [16]. The
functional decomposition represents the high-level functions that the system
must perform to meet system requirements.
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Figure 2.4 outlines the operatingmodes for themicrogrid and potential nanogrids illustrating
the process of planned/unplanned disconnection and returning to a complete re-connection
to the utility grid.
Figure 2.4. Microgrid and Nanogrid Operating Modes [16].The figure shows
how a microgrid or nanogrids can move between different modes of operation.
Step 1.2: Collect Solar, Critical Load, and, Current Microgrid Data
Critical load energy consumption data is obtained from the DOE using hourly load data
referencing 70% of the buildings within the United States used for building energy studies
[65]. Historical solar incidence data is collected from 1991–2010 for climate conditions in
Monterey, California [66]. We specifically use solar data from the year 2000 for illustrative
purposes. Load data analysis indicates that the highest amount of electricity use occurs
from January to March while simultaneously having the worst PV power output. This
worst case scenario of high power demand and low solar output power is the time of year
used for the rest of this Case Study. This ensures that energy resilience is evaluated in
the worst conditions when adversaries are more likely to attempt hostile actions. Table 2.1
shows the summary of the critical loads within the existing microgrid. For the purposes
of the case study, these values are derived from only taking into consideration the critical
electricity needed to maintain mission operations at a military base such as Naval Support
Activity Monterey which is assumed to be 50% of interior lighting and 67% of interior
equipment [43]. This eliminates the use of auxiliary services of water heaters, fans, and
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electric cooling and heating systems among others that provide comfort service rather than
mission-critical needs [65]. This critical load assumption is then used to calculate the hourly
load (kW). The hourly load data is compiled to during the selected time of year to determine
the maximum and average critical load values for each type of facility.
Table 2.1. Building Load Data. This data is derived from the DOE Com-
mercial Reference Building dataset hourly load data [65]. This data is used
to extract the average maximum load and average normal load for associate
facility types.
Load Facility Type Average Maximum Load (kW) Average Normal Load (kW)
1 Small Office 5.8 2.8
2 Small Office 5.8 2.8
3 Medium Office 71.3 32.3
4 Large Office 524.9 267.5
5 Warehouse 31 10.9
Step 1.3: Define Critical Loads and MDI Scores
Table 2.2 represents the scaling of loads developed from the NAVFAC, United States
Coast Guard (USCG) Office of Civil Engineering, and National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA)’s MDI and modified to fit our design [67]. All the loads simulated
within our design are deemed critical and therefore a relative scale was developed.
Table 2.2. MDI Scores for Individual Loads. Information from USCG Office
of Civil Engineering, and NASA are used to calculate the case study MDI
scores. In the case study, all MDI scores are represented on a 0–100 scale
and all loads shown are considered critical.
MDI Score Load Load Type
14 1 Small Office
14 2 Small Office
53 3 Medium Office
84 4 Large Office
89 5 Warehouse
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Step 1.4: Size Potential DER Configurations for Specific Critical Loads
It is apparent from Table 2.1 that appropriate sizing of DERs is needed to accommodate the
various critical loads. Each proposed nanogrid within the microgrid will have an associated
DER that favors the average normal load and withstands the maximum critical load. Table
2.3 lists the summary of each nanogrid configuration.
Table 2.3. Nanogrid DER Sizing Data. Sizing of generator power output is
derived from specification sheets from generator datasheets [68]–[71].Fuel
storage for each generator is calculated for a 7 day period based on fuel
consumption rate. PV array size is determined by simulating PV power out-
put from solar irradiance data based on each nanogrid relying solely on PV
generation and ESS storage.
Load 1 and 2 3 4 5 Microgrid
Mission Impact 14 53 84 89 -
Maximum Critical Load (kW) 5.8 71.3 524.9 31 -
GEN Power Output (kW) 20 80 300 60 300
GEN Fuel Storage (gal) 1,385 2,147 3,696 1,512 8,740
Battery Capacity (kW*hr) 384 5,384 30,769 538 37,075
Battery Output (kW) 40 300 1,000 70 1,410
PV Array Area (<2) 50 500 5,360 160 6,070
Generator power output values and fuel consumption are derived from the specification
sheets from companies such as Cummins and GENERAC [68]–[71]. Fuel storage for each
generator is calculated from fuel consumption in gallons per hour and provisioned for 7
days with expected refuel to endure the mission duration of 14 days (this is a common
tactic to reduce stored on-site fuel at both civilian and military facilities [72]). PV array
area is determined by simulating PV power output from the solar irradiance data based
on each nanogrid solely relying on PV generation and ESS storage. However, many bases
have limited land available for large PV installations. While not widely implemented yet at
military bases, civilian facilities have begun placing solar canopies over parking lots both to
increase solar generation area and also to shade cars from the sun. Thus the total available
area for PV often may not meet the goal of supporting critical loads entirely off of PV and
ESS. In this case study, we assume approximately 6,000 <2 is available for PV. This is
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close to reaching the goal of both the diesel generator and the PV and ESS independently
supporting the critical load on each nanogrid.
Iterations are done on each nanogrid until the generation capacity is able to accommodate
the maximum and average critical loads with no load shedding. The simulation model of the
nanogrid uses hourly time steps in order to determine the mission impact, load shedding,
and system response for each scenario through deterministic methods [43]. Load shedding
in our simulation is a vital factor in determining the constraints of the system and facility
behavior. Energy demands notmet result in required load sheddingwhich influencesmission
impact [33]. Load shedding can impact the critical loads which can in turn impact national
security [73]. Ensuring nanogrid DERs are sized appropriately ensures we are meeting the
active power balance equation %;>03 = %4=4A0C43 + %10CC4A~ at a steady state with all load
demands being met [33].
2.5.2 Step 2: Develop and Down-Select Nanogrid Architectures
Step 2.1: Evaluate Potential Nanogrid Architectures
An analysis of potential nanogrid infrastructure is performed in order to determine the
most beneficial system architectures for Naval Support Activity Monterey including the
benefits and drawbacks of DC and AC based nanogrids, centralized and decentralized
control systems, and other important metrics. The primary viable nanogrid structures are:
1) DC-based nanogrid with centralized control, 2) AC-based nanogrid with centralized
control, 3) AC-based nanogrid with decentralized control, and 4) DC-based nanogrid with
decentralized control. A Pugh Matrix is provided in Table 2.4 that shows the different
potential nanogrid structures and their benefits and drawbacks.
The analysis in Table 2.4 indicates that an AC nanogrid would be better than a DC
nanogrid with centralized control. However, the need for energy security and survivability
is paramount to military installations. This outweighs the other existing criteria. Therefore,
a DC nanogrid with a decentralized controller is chosen as the best design solution for
the research objective and stakeholder concerns. This design optimizes power balance by
independently controlling each load, DER, and ESS [74].
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Table 2.4. Pugh Matrix for Nanogrid Design. The baseline (DATUM) design
of the DC-based centralized controller nanogrid is compared against the
alternatives. The +, -, and 0 symbols indicate “better,” “worse,” and “no
difference” respectively for each criteria for each of the three alternatives to
the DATUM. The criteria are summed for each alternative and the DATUM;
this provides a ranking which a base energy manager can use to inform a
final decision (the “revised ranking”). In the case study, while the ranking
indicates the AC-Based/Centralized Controller is most preferred, the base
energy manager has decided to overrule the ranking and instead has indicated
























































Ease of Integration D + + 0
Efficiency A - - 0
Initial Capital Required T + + 0
Reliability U 0 + +
Safety/Grounding M + + 0
Communication Cohesion 0 - -
SUM: - 2 2 0
Ranking - 2 1 3
Revised Ranking - 3 2 1
Keep YES NO NO NO
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Step 2.2: Develop One-line Nanogrid and Microgrid Designs
Figure 2.5 represents the microgrid and proposed nanogrids for the Naval Support Activity
Monterey case study.
Figure 2.5. Microgrid and Nanogrid Design. This one-line diagram represents
the overview of the chosen nanogrid architecture highlighting the amount of
loads, DERs, and controller architecture.
Step 2.3: Develop Nanogrid Operational Concept View
Next an operational concept view of the baseline (microgrid only) and proposed nanogrids
for the fictionalized version of the Northern California-located Naval Support Activity
Monterey base which is shown in Figure 2.6. The illustration highlights the infrastructure
similarities and differences while also illustrating key generic elements of DOD installations
(e.g., base perimeter which is often fenced, entry control points, utility grid connection
(PCC), etc.
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Figure 2.6. Operational Concept View of Naval Support Activity Monterey.
Baseline microgrid is represented in the top diagram while the proposed
microgrid augmented with nanogrids is represented in the bottom diagram.
2.5.3 Step 3: Analyze Threats to Base Energy Security
Step 3.1: Reference Baseline Threats
In this case study, we use the baseline threats outlined in Step 3.1 in the Methodology
(Section 3) above.We also include cyber attack because the fictionalized case study assumes
that Naval Support ActivityMonterey has extensive SCADA systems and automation (many
military bases have not yet upgraded to SCADA systems and automated or remote-operated
controls) which can be vulnerable to cyber attack [12], [75], [76], severe storms due to the
installation’s proximity to the coastline, and plane crash due to proximity of runways and
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flight paths to critical loads. As opposed to civilian microgrids and nanogrids, militaries
are often specifically concerned with plane crashes due to a variety of causes (training
accident, intentional attack, equipment malfunction, etc.,) and with the potential for much
worse outcomes due to munitions and fuel loads [77]. We omit additional threats beyond
these for brevity. However, a full analysis of a real military installation should ensure any
additional location-specific threats are accounted for. The following threats are analyzed
in the case study: loss of all generators, loss of all PV, insider threat, fire, explosion, fuel
delivery disruption, cyber attack, severe storms, and plane crash.
Step 3.2: Determine Percent Occurrence of Threat per Year
Table 2.5 outlines the probability of occurrence of postulated threats. The probabilities for
these threats are developed from historical weather data, familiarization with the location
and threat dependency, and related research [33], [63], [64]. Because all applicable threats
have a probability that is greater than or equal to two percent, the case study continues
forward with all of the threats in Table 2.5.
Table 2.5. Probability of Occurrence for Postulated Threats. The threats
and probabilities are derived from a number of sources including natural
disasters (e.g., fire, flood, fire, seismic, high winds, tornado, hurricane, etc.)
and human-caused events [63], [64]. It is important to note the limitations
on historical data due to climate change. Increasing climate changed has
caused considerable changes in weather patterns and poses risk to military
installations.
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Step 3.3: Develop Microgrid and Nanogrid Threat Scenarios
Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 matrices illustrate the scenarios that are connected to each threat in
order to determine nanogrid resilience compared to current microgrid resilience. Each “X”
in the tables is an indication of a specific piece of equipment being unavailable, offline, or
destroyed within the specific threat scenario.
Table 2.6. The microgrid components that are offline, unavailable, or de-
































Loss of all Generators X X
Loss of all PV Arrays X
Insider Threat Sabotage X X X
External
Fire X X X X
Explosion X X X X
Fuel Delivery Disruption X X
Cyber-Attack X X
Severe Storm X X X X X X X X X
Plane Crash X X X X X
Figure 2.7 illustrates the operational concept view for a threat of a fire. This illustrates that
a fire can effect more than just the loads compromised and is dependent on the situation.
The fire threat scenario assumes that the spread of the fire was able to be stopped on the
north-east side of base and did not impact any of the power lines to the rest of the base.
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Table 2.7. Nanogrid Threat Scenarios. The nanogrid components that are


















































Loss of all Generators X X X X
Loss of all PV Arrays X X X X
Insider Threat Sabotage X X X X
External
Fire X X X X X X
Explosion X X X X X X
Fuel Delivery Disruption X X X X
Cyber-Attack X X X X X X X X
Severe Storm X X X X X X X X X X X X
Plane Crash X X X
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Figure 2.7. Threat of Fire Operation Concept View. The large shaded red
circle indicates area destroyed by fire. In the microgrid scenario (top), the
fire destroys the warehouse and large office building (Critical Loads 4 and
5), and both diesel generators. In the nanogrid scenario, the same buildings
and associated nanogrids are destroyed.
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2.5.4 Step 4: Calculate Resilience
Step 4.1: Simulate Nanogrid Systems
The threat scenarios are then simulated in MATLAB. Referring back to Section 2.3 (En-
ergy Resilience) all associated equations (Equations 2.1 and 2.2) are embedded within the
MATLAB code. While we used MATLAB, the simulations can be developed in almost any
programming language desired.
Step 4.2: Check for Unacceptable Load Shed
The number of hours load shed for each threat scenario results in no risk to national security.
All scenarios simulated within the proposed nanogrid only load shed the applicable loads
that are directly impacted by the threat (e.g., the load is destroyed) and keeps the remaining
critical loads online throughout the 14 day mission. The insider threat scenario shows the
microgrid shedding all five critical loads for approximately 200 hours of a 336 hour mission.
This places national security at risk. However, the proposed nanogrid architecture is able to
maintain all critical loads not directly impacted in spite of the insider threat.
Step 4.3: Calculate Mission Impact Across All Threats
Table 2.8 shows the resulting mission impacts ("B).
We use Equation 2.3 to calculate the EEDMI of the proposed nanogrid to compare resilience
against the existing microgrid. Table 2.9 shows the resulting EEDMI for the existing micro-
grid and proposed nanogrid.
" C =
" ;>031 + ";>032 + ";>033 + ";>034 + ";>035
(2.3)
Overall the simulation results show that nanogrids improve EEDMI scores for a threat of
an explosion, an insider threat, and plane crash, where both nanogrids and the baseline
microgrid see similar resilience for all remaining threats. It is important to note that because
of appropriate DER scaling for both existing microgrid and proposed nanogrid infrastruc-
tures, the loss of all diesel generators, the loss of all PV generation, and a disruption in
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Table 2.8. Mission Impact of Simulation Results. The Mission Impact ("B)
values for the nanogrid and microgrid architectures are shown for each threat.
The bold values indicate the lower mission impact (less impactful, better)
outcome. In all cases, the nanogrid either performs the same or better than
the microgrid architecture.


























Loss of all Generators 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Loss of all PV Arrays 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Insider Threat Sabotage 0 0 6,201 16,884 0 23,085 50,800
External
Fire 0 0 0 28,224 29,904 58,128 58,128
Explosion 4,704 0 17,808 0 0 22,512 30,589
Fuel Delivery Disruption 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cyber-Attack 4,704 4,704 17,808 10,080 29,904 67,200 67,200
Severe Storm 4,704 4,704 17,808 28,224 29,904 85,344 85,344
Plane Crash 4,704 0 0 0 0 4,704 85,344
fuel delivery do not impact resilience. However, if diesel generators, and PV and ESS were
not appropriately sized to provide redundant generating capacity, this would not be the
case. Having redundant generation capacity is realistic because many military bases already
have redundant generation capacity already installed – in some cases redundant generation
capacity can be an order of magnitude higher than average base loads.
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Table 2.9. EEDMI Simulation Results. These values are resilience measure-
ments for each threat scenario and are compared between the existing mi-



























Loss of all Generators 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Loss of all PV Arrays 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Insider Threat Sabotage 0 0 620 1,688 0 2,309 5,080
External
Fire 0 0 0 1,411 1,495 2,906 2,906
Explosion 188 0 712 0 0 900 1,224
Fuel Delivery Disruption 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cyber-Attack 470 470 1,781 1,008 2,990 6,720 6,720
Severe Storm 94 94 356 564 598 1,707 1,707
Plane Crash 94 0 0 0 0 94 1,707
Total EEDMI 14,636 19,344
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2.5.5 Step 5: Analyze Results
Based on the results of Step 4, the case study moves forward and does not need iteration
at this point. The proposed nanogrids are as or more resilient than the existing microgrid.
Because of the SCADA system deployed at the military installation, and location of runways
for military aircraft, cyber attacks and plane crashes can impact both the microgrid and
proposed nanogrids. It is important for the base energy manager and stakeholders to stay
one step ahead and test all vulnerable SCADA systems within any base energy system, and
continually upgrade cyber security.
2.5.6 Step 6: Produce Final Design Recommendations
Are Stakeholder Requirements Met? Final recommendations for the case study con-
clude that stakeholders from the base command, tenant commands, local energy companies,
microgrid provider, maintenance personnel, and chain of command all have their require-
ments met with the proposed nanogrid design. The nanogrid design validates top level
functional requirements of: generate power, distribute power, control power, and store en-
ergy.
Is Funding Available? Improving resilience by implementing nanogrids on critical loads
within the current base microgrid structure is determined to be effective for a majority of
the threat scenarios. We make the assumption that funding is available to implement the
nanogrids rapidly and that no selection of specific nanogrids based on available funding
needs to occur. Note that we explicitly did not conduct cost analysis within the proposed
methodology. However, base energy managers often conduct cost studies when choosing
between different potential energy system upgrades. The case study does not mention if
funding is available because this is often encountered in the acquisition process of program
upgrades and is beyond the scope of this research. This research focuses on how to improve
military installation energy resilience.
2.6 Discussion and Future Work
This paper presents a methodology that can be used to determine if supplementing existing
microgrids onmilitary bases with nanogridsmay improve energy resilience. Through proper
sizing of generation and storage resources, it is possible for nanogrids to eliminate or greatly
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reduce many of the energy disruptions to critical loads that can impact national security on
military bases.We believe that themethodologywill aid base energymanagers in identifying
which critical loads will benefit from implementing nanogrids for specific threats that are
of concern to individual military bases. While we advocate for some threats to be analyzed
in all cases, many threats are not universal across all bases. Thus, we assert that there is not
universal guidance on which loads should or should not be outfitted with nanogrids.
The methodology is specifically meant as a high-level systems engineering analysis of
existing microgrid infrastructure and proposed nanogrid infrastructure. The time step on
the simulations in the case study is 1 hour. This large time step and the simple power
flow model ignore real concerns such as transients that can trip protection equipment; the
ability of specific generation and storage equipment, and power electronics hardware to
be grid-forming; and other issues. If implementing nanogrids at a specific military base
proves promising based on the results produced by the methodology, then detailed electrical
engineering analysis should be conducted to verify no other concerns exist.
Developing threat probabilities can be challenging especially for human-caused threats and
even more so for situations where adversaries are involved. Producing detailed methods of
estimating such probabilities are beyond the scope of this work. Natural disasters and other
nature-caused threats have significant historical data available to estimate their probabilities
of occurrence. However, climate change and other related factors may begin to call into
question using historical data to estimate future probabilities of occurrence of natural threats.
We specifically do not address the cost of increasing energy resilience through the imple-
mentation of nanogrids. Other work has investigated the costs associated with increasing
resilience and has attempted to produce energy resilience versus cost curves for decision-
makers to understand how much resilience may be gained with a specific level of invest-
ment [46]. A potential future expansion of this work is to include cost analysis.
After recent events in Texas [17], we believe renewed focus will be placed on upgrading
military microgrids to be more self-sufficient and not rely upon fossil fuels or regular fossil
fuel delivery. Further, price shocks in regional and global oil markets due to issues such as
the closing of key sea lanes to tanker traffic have occurred in the past and are starting to
occur as of writing this article due to things such as war and most recently a stuck cargo ship
blocking a canal [78] can significantly impact military budgets. Removing highly variable
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diesel fuel bills from base energy manager budgets could be a significant stabilizing force
on year-to-year management of energy infrastructure.
We use MDI scoring to understand the relative importance of critical loads to national
defense. However, MDI has several significant flaws and other recently proposed metrics
have their own issues. Future work needs to develop a new method of understanding how
each load on a military base impacts national security. One potential avenue to explore is
mission engineering where tying specific mission objectives to specific loads under specific
force protection postures may help to produce a better measure.
2.7 Conclusion
We present a systems engineering methodology that is useful for conducting high level en-
ergy resilience analysis of military base energy infrastructure to determine if implementing
nanogrids within an existing microgrid helps to protect electrical loads critical to national
security from power outages. The methodology takes into account threats that are of specific
interest to the military such as adversary actions and terrorist attacks. Rather than focusing
on reducing energy cost during nominal conditions (as most civilian energy analyses attempt
to achieve), our method focuses on improving resilience to threats.
A case study is presented of a fictionalized Naval Support Activity Monterey military
base where the Naval Postgraduate School is located. Several threats of interest to all
military bases and of specific interest to military bases located on coastal California are
analyzed against a proposed microgrid with nanogrid augmentation using the method. This
case study demonstrates how the methodology can help a base energy manager to select
an appropriate nanogrid and show the feasibility of the nanogrid in improving energy
resilience of specific critical loads from a national security perspective as compared to
existing microgrid infrastructure.
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This chapter summarizes the research performed for the thesis and outlines the findings
of the case study and gaps that can be used to motivate future work. In addition, larger
implications of this research for the Navy and DOD are addressed. Lastly, the methodology
developed to aid base energy managers in assessment of nanogrid energy resilience is
analyzed for future work beyond what exists within the manuscript (Chapter 2).
3.1 Conclusion
There is a high potential for nanogrids to eliminate or significantly reduce the energy dis-
ruptions to critical loads on DOD installations. The results of the case study within this
thesis conclude that the methodology can be useful for base energy managers to assess grid
architecture and evaluate resilience; however, there is room for improvement. These im-
provements include reducing simulation time step to realistically model the real concerns of
transients that can trip protection equipment, incorporation of specific generation and stor-
age equipment beyond those used in the case study, analysis of power electronics hardware
that can be grid-forming, production of detailed estimation of threat probabilities with the
use of extensive historical information with the inclusion of climate change, incorporating
cost with implementation of nanogrids, and expanding the understanding of the effect MDI
values have on national security.
Overall, the results of this research suggest that nanogrids can improve resilience from
existing microgrid architectures. Though nanogrids are in the early stages of research and
development, they have a promising future in energy security. This improvement, in addition
to microgrid benefits, has the inherent capability to improve energy security and also may
reduce carbon footprint which can slow the effects of climate change. In addition, climate
change has shown significant correlation to global security and on a smaller scale, for each
individual country, national security. A significant consequence of climate change is the
increasing probability of extreme weather occurrences [3]. Instances such as flooding in
NorfolkNaval Station and hurricanes affectingDOD installations in PuertoRico andPanama
City, Florida have cost the United States government billions of dollars per year [2], [3]. Not
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only can the use of nanogrids improve resilience of existing microgrids, but nanogrids may
also reduce the effects of climate change, increase global security, and allow the redirection
of funds otherwise used for utility grid outages to more important acquisition projects that
will enhance national security.
3.2 Future Work
The incorporation of the high level systems engineering methods and MBSE aided the
development of the methodology developed in this thesis. Awareness of these benefits has
initiated interest in expanding the research by using alternative DER and ESS that differ
from the PV and batteries used within the case study. Examples of potential various DER
include a hydroturbine and a dual-sterling liquid air energy storage [79], [80].
With themajority of naval bases being near water, the use of a hydroturbinewithinmicrogrid
and nanogrid architectures can be beneficial.As one of the largest andmostmature renewable
source of electricity in the world, hydroturbine implementation into a nanogrid or microgrid
architecture has the potential to be more cost effective and efficient than other recent DER
innovations [79]. The electricity generation process converts water pressure into mechanical
shaft power [81]. The only hindering factor (or challenge to future work) is the power
available is proportional to pressure head and the volumetric flow rate, creating a challenge
for implementation due to most Navy installations being at sea level where the production
of energy with the use of falling water can be hard to achieve [79], [81].
As a promising alternative to powering excess demand, Liquid Air Energy Storage (LAES)
can aid when renewable generation subsides [80]. This type of ESS uses liquid air that is
expanded through a turbine, proving power to systems such as a microgrid [80]. Research
in energy recovery with the use of a dual Stirling cycle LAES system is a promising ESS
technology. Expanding this work and associating it with the nanogrid simulation performed
within this research could be useful for alternative nanogrid architectures.
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It is wise to evaluate the substitution of alternative DER and ESS in nanogrid and microgrid
architectures to investigate the potential for improved resilience. Keeping an open mind
with related research topics and incorporation of new, old, and improved technology will
aid in this development. Though the research conducted within this thesis used a limited set
of DER and ESS in the case study, future case studies should incorporate expanded DER
and ESS technologies.
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